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INTRODUCTION
The United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union was a tortuous
journey. Few who witnessed the victory for Leave in the early hours of June 24,
2016, would have imagined that the United Kingdom’s formal independence
from the European Union (E.U.) would not be secured until January 30, 2020,
or that the country would still be beholden to E.U. law until December 31, 2020.
Inevitably, the duration and complexity of this process have overwhelmed,
frustrated, and often bored many citizens; indeed, the political machinations of
those four years exhausted even the most avid followers of British parliamentary
procedure. That said, the period was also illuminated from time to time by
moments of high drama within the House of Commons. Westminster Hall, the
ancient venue that has played host to so many vital moments in the nation’s
history, emerged once more as the epicentre of British political life, occasions
of passionate rhetoric and sensational procedural twists reminding us that the
heart of the United Kingdom’s unwritten constitution rests in the customs and
traditions of this very chamber.
In this article, I reflect upon how the role played by Parliament, in giving
effect to the referendum vote, has cast a light upon the legislature itself,
illuminating more clearly than any other issue in recent times the constitutional
role and authority of Parliament today. The House of Commons has been the
theatre in which the Brexit play has been performed, but it is also the case that
the difficulties which Brexit has posed for the British body politic have called
into question Parliament’s claim to supremacy within this very system, and in
particular, the very idea of “parliamentary sovereignty.” Challenges have
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emerged from various sources. I reflect upon the following rivals to, or potential
constraints upon, Parliament’s ultimate constitutional authority: direct
democracy, divisions within Parliament itself, the role of a Speaker of the House
of Commons, an increasingly assertive Supreme Court, Her Majesty’s
Government, and, finally, the constitutionally assertive devolved territories of
the United Kingdom (U.K.).

I. PARLIAMENT: SOVEREIGN OR SUPREME?
The terms “supremacy” and “sovereignty” are often used interchangeably
in relation to Parliament. I begin by distinguishing these concepts and presenting
my sense of the relationship between the two. In the absence of a codified
constitution, such as that which the United States has enjoyed for over 230 years,
‘parliamentary sovereignty’ is typically presented as the cornerstone of the U.K.
constitution. There have been many efforts to explain this idea, none more
influential than that offered by Albert Venn Dicey, an English constitutional
jurist whose main corpus of work appeared between the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, a period of intense constitutional debate surrounding the
issues of Irish Home Rule and the balance of constitutional authority between
the Lords and the Commons. Dicey brought to his study of the U.K.’s
constitution that combination of political self-confidence and narrow positivism
which came to characterise modern legal scholarship in the Whig tradition. His
attempt to distil the essence of the U.K.’s arcane and ancient governing
arrangements, captured in the Introduction to the Study of the Law of the
Constitution,1 often resonates more as revelation than explanation.
Dicey captured what he termed “parliamentary sovereignty” as the
“keystone” of the constitution, or as the “the central principle” of the system,
“on which all the rest depends.”2 This principle embodies two dimensions:
“[T]hat Parliament… has, under the English constitution, the right to make or
unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by
the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of
Parliament.”3 This account, which barely changed from the first edition of his
book published in 1885 to the eighth appearing in 1915, is almost theological in
its methodology. Parliament is conceived of as both omnipotent and eternal. The
only limitation upon its lawful power is imposed by logic, not by law: the
incapacity of an all-powerful legislature to constrain its own competence. In
short, Parliament can do anything but bind itself; any law made by Parliament
can later be unmade by Parliament.
As an account of Parliament’s authority within the U.K. system, Dicey’s
thesis is both attractively simple and rationally compelling, recognised as
accurate on many occasions by the courts over the ensuing century.4 The theory
has, however, been criticised from several perspectives by academic
1

See generally ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
(Macmillan & Co., 8th ed. 1915).
2
Id. at 68.
3
Id. at 38.
4
See, e.g., Burmah Oil Company Ltd. v. Lord Advocate, [1965] AC 75. And recently endorsed in a major
report by the HOUSE OF LORDS CONSTITUTION COMMITTEE, RESPECT AND CO-OPERATION: BUILDING A
STRONGER UNION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, 2021-22, HL 142, at 27-32.
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commentators. One objection is empirical in nature, questioning whether there
are in fact legal limitations on Parliament’s authority;5 a second is conceptual,
contending that it is theoretically possible for Parliament to limit its own
legislative competence;6 while a third contestation is more moral-normative in
form, not necessarily questioning the internal coherence of Dicey’s account as a
matter of legal fact or political logic, but raising ideological concerns with the
very idea of unlimited legislative power.7
In another paper, written with Martin Loughlin, I pose a fourth criticism of
Dicey’s account, suggesting that the term “sovereignty” is misused in
descriptions of Parliament’s authority and that conceptual imprecision has
resulted in damaging confusion about the role of Parliament within the U.K.
state.8 Dicey’s account of Parliament’s authority is concerned principally with
the locus of ultimate constitutional authority. It is, in essence, a positivist
account of legal supremacy, a search for the locus of the “last word” within the
polity: an issue that has vexed legal theorists such as Austin, Kelsen, and Hart.
In this way, legal supremacy, which focuses upon inter-institutional
relationships, has been fused and hence confused with constitutional
sovereignty, a significantly broader concept. Sovereignty encompasses the entire
relationship between legal authority on the one hand, and the political capacity
available to political institutions to exercise this authority on the other; in a
modern state, this relationship hinges essentially upon both the legitimacy of that
lawful authority, howsoever that legitimacy is calibrated within any particular
constitutional system, and upon its efficacy in relation to other sources of
authority, internal and external to the state.9 In short, “sovereignty” embraces
not only lawful authority but the political facts that give that lawful authority
meaning within any modern democracy.
Dicey was correct in his assessment of the internal dimension of
sovereignty. Parliament is indeed legislatively supreme. However, since he was
concerned with the power of Parliament to make law within the U.K.’s
constitutional system, his core doctrine is better expressed as “the legislative
supremacy of Parliament” rather than the sovereignty of Parliament.
Constitutional sovereignty in the United Kingdom is conditioned by certain
political facts and legal commitments. The two which have most significantly
served to condition Parliament’s legislative supremacy in recent decades are the
primacy of E.U. law (binding upon the U.K. for the period of its E.U.
membership) on the one hand, and the creation of devolved systems of
government for Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland on the other. The
For example, the diminution of Parliament’s jurisdictional reach resulting from decolonisation. See
PETER OLIVER, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDEPENDENCE (2015).
6
Most clear in the “manner and form” debate. See, e.g., T.R.S. ALLAN, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LAW 13536 (2013); see also MICHAEL GORDON, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY IN THE UK CONSTITUTION
(2015) (especially Chapter 7).
7
Lord Hope of Craighead, Is the Rule of Law now the Sovereign Principle?, in SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
LAW 89-97 (Richard Rawlings, Peter Leyland & Alison Young eds., 2013).
8
Martin Loughlin & Stephen Tierney, The Shibboleth of Sovereignty, 81 MODERN L. REV. 989-1016
(2018).
9
I am concerned here with sovereignty only in its internal or constitutional dimension. In a broader sense,
sovereignty is the core doctrine of modern state authority, possessed of two dimensions, internal
constitutional authority and external or state sovereignty. The United Kingdom, like any state, is
sovereign in relation to other states. The nature of its internal constitutional arrangements does not affect
that fact. In discussing only internal or constitutional sovereignty, I am not concerned with external
sovereignty except insofar as it has an impact upon constitutional sovereignty.
5
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sovereignty of the U.K. as a constitutional state can only be understood by
situating Parliament’s law-making authority in both these contexts.
The interface between supremacy and sovereignty is not unique to an
unwritten constitution. All constitutions operate within a broader political
environment that conditions their operation and which over time can, in
sometimes imperceptible ways, fundamentally change understandings of
constitutional authority. Bruce Ackerman’s work on the tectonic plate changes
occurring beneath the formal text of the U.S. Constitution, occurring without
recourse to, or at least strongly conditioning the exercise of, the Article V
amendment procedure, is a case in point.10 The nature of constitutional
sovereignty in the U.K., as anywhere, needs to be understood in this wider
context, and it is in light of the interaction between Parliament’s supremacy,
limited as it is to Parliament’s law-making role, on the one hand, and of the
various other institutions and political forces within the constitution which
operate to condition the exercise of this supremacy on the other hand, that I
address the role of Parliament in the Brexit process. I do not contest Parliament’s
ultimate law-making authority; I seek instead to assess the forces which
increasingly condition the exercise of this authority, and which make the idea of
constitutional sovereignty within the U.K. a much more complex beast than
mere legal supremacy.

II. PARLIAMENT AND THE REFERENDUM: UNLEASHING POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY?
One important way in which Parliament’s “sovereignty” has arguably been
circumscribed is through self-constraint. The referendum has emerged in recent
decades as a vehicle through which fundamental constitutional decisions are
made, removing these decisions in whole or in part from the determining power
of Parliament.
The U.K.’s relationship with the European Union, formerly the European
Communities, has played a significant part in this story. Of the three national
referendums held in the U.K., two have concerned Europe. The first was held in
1975. The U.K. joined the European Communities (EC) on January 1, 1973, and
the incoming Labour government in February 1974 was committed to a
referendum on whether or not the country should continue that membership.
Sixty-seven percent voted that it should. The 1975 referendum contains obvious
parallels to the referendum held in 2016, where the new Conservative
government was beholden to a similar pre-election commitment to put the issue
of European membership to the people. In each case recourse, to the referendum
was more a matter of pragmatism than principle, inspired not by a commitment
to popular democracy, but by the need to defuse an internal party dispute that
threatened to split the government. The Labour Party in the early 1970s was
divided by the question of Europe in a way similar to the Conservatives in later
decades. Ironically, four decades ago, it was the left-wing of Labour that
opposed EC membership, while opposition to the European Union in more
10

BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). See also GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN &
YANIV ROZNAI, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (2020) and REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTIONALISM:
LAW, LEGITIMACY, POWER (Richard Albert ed., 2020).
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recent times is often attributed (not always correctly) to the right-wing of the
Conservative party.
The upshot was that the most significant constitutional issue of our times
was effectively removed on two seminal occasions from the remit of Parliament,
crucially, by Parliament itself which passed enabling legislation facilitating each
referendum. And while it is true that a referendum in the U.K. is not technically
binding, since Parliament can simply refuse to implement the outcome, such a
refusal is unheard of in any modern democracy.11 Within the U.K., the result of
every referendum has been implemented, albeit only after a significant political
struggle in relation to the 2016 vote. Given this political “automaticity,” the
resort to a referendum on the issue of Europe raises a clear question about
Parliament’s “sovereignty.” The question must be asked: if Parliament has
refused to take ownership of such a major decision, perhaps the most significant
constitutional decision since Irish Home Rule, then while it may well be
legislatively supreme, can it really be described as the sovereign authority in
relation to such a vital issue?
In reflecting upon the EC/E.U. referendums of 1975 and 2016 and the place
that direct democracy now plays in the constitution, it is useful to contrast the
current approach with events over a century ago when direct democracy became
a topic of debate in relation to the troubled issue of Ireland before the First World
War. Dicey himself emerged in this period as a significant player, not only for
his work as a jurist but as an ardent opponent of Home Rule. Dicey was a deeply
complex figure, as recent archival work and subsequent intellectual and personal
biographies bear out.12 From one perspective, he was an analytical
constitutionalist combining historical evidence with subtle legal methodology to
expound a tightly construed account of legal rule. He was also, unlike many of
his contemporaries (and indeed many later British constitutionalists), alive to the
significance of the union or territorial dimension that is so key to understanding
the U.K.’s constitutional evolution.13 At the same time, he was also very much
a politically engaged intellectual, and on no issue was he so exercised as the
constitutional status of Ireland where his deep Unionism drew him into the
political fray. Since Dicey’s working life, principally in the four decades from
1880-1920, was also the period of intense turmoil in Ireland, as it passed through
the bloody birth pangs to Free Statehood, his intellectual work must be read in
the context of his political engagement.
Dicey resisted all moves to give Ireland even limited self-government. A
line in the sand for him, should most of Ireland move to some degree of
independence, was the protection of the political right of Ulstermen to remain
British, even if that meant partition and the division of the island in two. But in
his political activism, a deep paradox emerged. Dicey not only articulated
11

STEPHEN TIERNEY, CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUMS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF REPUBLICAN
DELIBERATION 1-18 (2012). Ironically, the European Union stands out in contrast to this approach. It has
repeatedly refused to accept the outcome of referendums in which voters in Denmark, Ireland, France,
and the Netherlands have rejected various initiatives promoting further integration. Id. at 154-67.
12
A.V. DICEY, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM (J. W. F. Allison ed. 2019); MARK D. WALTERS,
A.V. DICEY AND THE COMMON LAW CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION: A LEGAL TURN OF MIND (2020); A.
Jackson, The Failure of British and Irish Federalism, c.1800-1950, in THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE
FEDERAL IDEA (Robert Schütze & Stephen Tierney eds., 2018); Dylan Lino, Albert Venn Dicey and the
Constitutional Theory of Empire, 36 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 751, 751-80 (2016).
13
A.V. DICEY & R.S. RAIT, THOUGHTS ON THE UNION BETWEEN ENGLAND & SCOTLAND (London:
Macmillan, 1920).
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Parliament’s legislative supremacy as the keystone of the constitution, but he
was also an ardent admirer of parliamentary authority as a flexible and
successful alternative to constitutional codification. At the same time, however,
he was also aware that through this very doctrine, Parliament could, by simple
legislative act, dismember the U.K. and grant the island of Ireland independence,
even in the face of strong popular opposition and even if this meant betraying,
as he saw it, the loyal British subjects in the north.
Dicey’s account of Parliament’s supremacy was, as I have suggested, almost
metaphysical in its range and scope: viewing it as both eternal and omnipotent.
But beyond these two dimensions, the theological analogy runs dry. Dicey
discovered, to his chagrin, that Parliament was not also omniscient and eternally
good but rather capable of grave error. On the issue of Ireland, Parliament
appeared in the years after 1885 to be embarked upon such a course. The Liberals
in that year had fought a general election without any commitment to Irish Home
Rule. After winning the election, however, Gladstone adopted Home Rule as a
policy. The problem for Dicey was that a narrow parliamentary majority could
therefore not only change the constitution, but do so in an underhand way,
adopting Edmund Burke’s approach to representation and supplanting popular
opinion with its own judgment.
Dicey saw this as a democratic outrage and alighted upon a constitutional
fix that would, at the same time, offer some constraint upon Parliament while
not limiting its ultimate law-making authority. His idea was that the referendum
would play the role of a “people’s veto” to moderate the risk that a narrow
victory within the House of Commons would be sufficient to bring about
profound constitutional change.
Dicey’s idea of the referendum has to be pieced together from his academic
work and personal letters. The constitutional status which he attributed to the
referendum was never entirely nailed down, but the clearest exposition of the
idea came with his proposal for a Referendum Act. This would provide for the
referendum in the course of the law-making process. Parliament would make
law in the usual way, but the Referendum Act would not allow Royal Assent to
be given to a bill that concerned fundamental constitutional questions until the
electorate had approved of the law in a referendum. If the referendum rejected
the change, the bill would not be sent for Royal Assent.
Dicey insisted that this was fundamentally a “conservative” proposal. And
certainly, his conception of the referendum’s place in the constitution was
limited in several ways. In the first place, it would intervene to prevent change,
not to prompt it. Dicey did not favour the “initiative” which would allow citizens
to propose legislation. In this way, the referendum would act as a supplement to
deliberative representative government of which Dicey was a great supporter,
not as an alternative to it.14 In some sense, Dicey saw the referendum as filling
the void left by the House of Lords which had lost so much of its influence in
the democratic era: as a check on the power of the Commons. The people’s voice
should be heard, not as an override of Parliament, but as a reminder to Parliament
from whence its power derives; supreme authority must be undergirded by the
legitimacy of consent.

Mads Qvortrup, A.V. Dicey: The Referendum as the People’s Veto, 20 HIST. OF POL. THOUGHT 531,
537 (citing a letter by Dicey).
14
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Another point Dicey strove to make was that the referendum would be
reserved for major issues; it would not become a fixture in political decisionmaking as it was in Switzerland. The dominant position of representative
democracy would remain. Indeed, the beauty of his proposal as he saw it was
that one could separate a constitutional issue from support for a party. One would
not be prevented from supporting the Liberal Party simply because of its
approach to Ireland. As Qvortrup puts it: “the referendum could provide voters
with the opportunity of supporting the party with which they were in general
policy agreement, while at the same time allowing them to vote against
constitutional proposals forwarded by that very same party.”15
Dicey also strove to fit the referendum within his conception of
parliamentary sovereignty. The Referendum Act would not be entrenched and
could be repealed. As Dicey acknowledged:
It is true that an Act of Parliament might repeal or override the
Referendum Act itself, but this though a plausible, is not a
valid objection. The Referendum Act would practically be
secured by the odium which any Ministry or party would incur
by depriving the people of their right to be appealed to. I am
quite certain that once established the Referendum would
never be gotten rid of by anything short of a revolution.16
While not a formal constraint on Parliament’s law-making supremacy,
Dicey envisaged the constitutional referendum as morally and politically
binding.
Although in his academic work Dicey elevated parliamentary supremacy as
a freestanding truth, his view on the Ireland question led him to nuance this
supremacy by setting it in the context of constitutional sovereignty, which was
a broader and more politically conditioned concept.17 He was explicit about this.
The time had come for Britain to adopt “from America the constitutional
provisions which, by delaying alterations in the Constitution, protect the
sovereignty of the people.”18 The people’s veto would restrain Parliament from
“a fundamental change passing into law [that] which the mass of the nation do
not desire.”19
When we fast forward to 1975 and then to 2016, the usage of referendums
in relation to Britain’s relationship with Europe came with a subtle twist on
Dicey’s logic. Dicey’s idea of the “people’s veto” was not agenda-setting, but
rather a brake in the system, giving Parliament cause to reconsider. Although
Dicey was interposing an additional step in the legislative process, Parliament
was still in control. In 2016, the model was arguably quite different. The entire
issue of E.U. membership was being handed over to the people—Parliament had
expressed no legislative view on whether the U.K. should leave the E.U.
15

Id. at 535.
Id. at 545.
17
Indeed, Bogdanor describes this approach as “paradoxical.” Vernon Bogdanor, “Western Europe,” in
Referendums Around the World: The Growing Use of Direct Democracy 24, 34 (David Butler & Austin
Ranney eds., Basingstoke) (1994).
18
A.V. Dicey, Ought the Referendum to be Introduced into England?, 57 THE CONTEMP. REV. 506
(1890).
19
Qvortrup, supra note 14, at 533, fn. 13 (citing Letter by A.V. Dicey to J. Bryce, March 23, 1911, (Bryce
Papers, Fol. 23, Bodleian Library, Oxford)).
16
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Parliament passed legislation in 2016 to facilitate the referendum and set the
electoral rules for the process, but it thereupon left the stage to the people who
were given ownership over this fundamental issue of constitutional change.20 In
this way, the 2016 referendum was certainly not a popular veto but far more akin
to the type of self-determination referendum which we have seen proliferate in
the latter half of the 20th century where the people play the ultimate authoritative
role by taking control of a fundamental issue; in effect, determining the external
dimension of state sovereignty for their territory by deciding whether or not to
leave an existing polity of which it is part. In this way, I tend to think of 2016 as
the ‘British Independence’ referendum in the same way as the process in
Scotland in 2014 is characterised as the “Scottish Independence” referendum. In
some sense, the British people’s role was even greater than that of the Scots. The
latter knew that if they voted for independence, they were voting in favour of a
policy supported by the Scottish Government. The British people in 2016 were
voting to set new state policy.
In this sense, the people were clearly the authors of Brexit. They were
presented with the issue in the referendum and were given a clear sense that their
vote would be determinative. It was, of course, not necessarily clear what Brexit
would mean, but it was clear that it was a decision for the people to make. It is
as a consequence of this that so many people reacted ferociously in 2019 at the
thought that parliamentarians had sought to wrestle this issue back from the
people in the intervening three years.21
There are important points of qualification here before we characterise 2016
as an act of utter self-abnegation by Parliament or that it marks a long-lasting
diminution of Parliament’s political role. First of all, it can be argued that the
referendum was not binding. In one sense, no referendum in the U.K. is binding
because it is always open to Parliament not to implement the result. The enabling
legislation did not even go so far as to declare that the result would have an
automatic effect. Secondly, the referendum was an exceptional event. Dicey’s
prescription that referendums be few and far between has been accepted by the
British political system. Apart from two national referendums on Europe the
only other U.K.-wide referendum took place in 2011 on the issue of the electoral
system. Unlike Ireland or Australia, the U.K. does not have a formal amendment
process that involves the referendum. That said, the referendum is a growing
part of constitutional practice in relation to the devolved territories where
referendums have been held in 1979 (Scotland, Wales), 1997 (Northern Ireland),
1998 (Scotland, Wales), 2011 (Wales) and 2014 (Scotland). Furthermore, there
are various pieces of legislation where Parliament has committed to holding
referendums as part of major constitutional decisions;22 ironically, the people’s
veto is now part of the law relating to any reunification of Ireland.23 It follows
from this growth that, in practice, a constitutional convention may now exist
according to which major constitutional decisions, such as relinquishing part of

20

Vernon Bogdanor, Europe and the Sovereignty of the People, 87 POL. QUART. 348 (2016).
There was in fact a risk between 2016-19 that Parliament would do the opposite of what Dicey had in
mind; he advocated a people’s veto of parliamentary law-making; what we nearly got was a legislative
veto of a popular decision.
22
Northern Ireland Act 1998, c. 47; Government of Wales Act 2006, c. 32; European Union Act 2011, c.
12 (repealed 2018); Scotland Act 2016. c. 11; and Wales Act 2017, c. 4.
23
Northern Ireland Act 1998, c. 47, § 1; id. at § 1(1), sch. 1.
21
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the territory of the state, abolishing the monarchy, or re-joining the European
Union, could not be effected without a referendum.24
Parliament remains legislatively supreme, but the first lesson of Brexit is
that when it denies itself the use of this authority in favour of popular will,
Parliament implicitly reminds us that the exercise of its legislative supremacy in
matters of fundamental constitutional change brings to the table the relationship
between legal supremacy and political legitimacy within a broader concept of
constitutional sovereignty. Dicey was alive to the legitimacy dimension of
Parliament’s power. He advocated the referendum because it was consistent with
“the doctrine which lies at the basis of English democracy—that the law depends
at bottom for its enactment on the consent of the nation as represented by the
electors.’”25 In a notable passage Dicey stated that although Parliament
represented the nation, it was not “the same as the nation.”26 Parliament itself
seems to increasingly recognise that this truth conditions its own authority over
fundamental constitutional change.

III. PARLIAMENT: A SOVEREIGN OF SOVEREIGNS?
Parliament may well be legislatively supreme, but this raises the question:
what is Parliament? It is in fact a deeply pluralised set of institutions. The lawmaking authority of Parliament is better framed as the legislative supremacy of
the Crown in Parliament. This reminds us that Parliament, in its law-making
role, involves a complex interaction between the Monarch, the Lords, and the
Commons. Draft law requires to pass through both houses and depends for its
authority upon Royal Assent, albeit that this assent is, by convention,
automatically granted.
The Brexit process illustrated how politically divided the institutions that
compose Parliament can be, both in relation to each other and internally.
Following the success of the Leave proposition in the referendum, the
Government struggled not only in its negotiations with the European Union but
in giving effect to any agreement which it did manage to reach. This became a
subtle and complex political struggle in which the European Union sought to
exploit these divisions, hoping that allies within both houses would serve to
frustrate the Brexit vote altogether, a strategy that enjoyed considerable success
until it was blown out of the water by the 2019 general election.
The House of Lords almost certainly had a majority within it that opposed
the U.K.’s withdrawal from the European Union. The hands of pro-Remain
Lords were, however, tied by the constitutional limitation of the Lords’ own role
in the law-making process: the upper house can only delay legislation passed by
the Commons, it cannot veto it.27 Furthermore, conventions regulate even this
delaying function. In particular, the Lords by established practice will not
oppose the second or third reading of any government bill promised in the

24

HOUSE OF LORDS CONSTITUTION COMMITTEE, REFERENDUMS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 2009-10,
HL 99, at 19-20.
25
Qvortrup, supra note 14, at 546.
26
Id. at 539 (citing A.V. Dicey, Representative Government (1900) (unpublished manuscript)).
27
Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, c. 103.

10

NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.

vol. XII:1

election manifesto of the governing party.28 Because the Conservative Party was
elected to government in both 2016 and 2019 with a commitment to giving effect
to the referendum result, this constrained the overt opposition of the Lords on a
number of important legislative proposals.
The Lords did, however, still act as a forum for opposition to Brexit-related
legislative proposals and helped to frustrate the passage of legislation designed
to implement the referendum. I will shortly argue that in some ways this critical
approach in fact helped improve the quality of legislation that was in the end
passed, but it is also significant in demonstrating that Parliament’s legislative
supremacy must be understood as the sum of various (at times deeply divided)
parts.
This brings us to the Commons itself. Theresa May replaced David Cameron
as Prime Minister in July 2016. She proposed a general election, held on June 8,
2017, in the hope of giving herself a bigger mandate with which to negotiate
Brexit. This plan backfired; the Conservatives lost their majority and could only
govern through an arrangement with the Democratic Unionist Party from
Northern Ireland. Even with this agreement, the Government’s working majority
was slim. For the next two years, the Government’s attempts to negotiate
agreement with the European Union and implement the agreement that was
reached were endlessly frustrated by opposition in the Commons. Many MPs
clearly sought to negate the result of the referendum. Of course, few openly
proclaimed this intention. The Liberal Democrats, in the end, came clean and
this led to their obliteration as a political force in the 2019 general election.
Others sought to do so disingenuously, attempting to make the agreement of a
withdrawal deal very difficult by imposing negotiating conditions on the
Government or suggesting that they would only support a deal with certain
stipulations such as remaining in the E.U. customs union or even the single
market, both of which would have denied Brexit any material substance. Law
was indeed passed that imposed conditions, not least the need for parliamentary
ratification of any draft agreement with Brussels.29
The most significant outcome of this period was in fact parliamentary
paralysis. With so much time spent on lengthy procedural debates, the passage
of important Brexit legislation became very difficult. Given the machinations
over the main Brexit bill (which became the European Union (Withdrawal) Act
2018), little time was available for other legislation.30 The Government was also
reluctant to advance other bills in case they were hijacked by amendments aimed
at frustrating Brexit, as was the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc.) Act
2019.31
This wearisome period from 2018−19 (what Richard Ekins has called “the
long crisis”) in the end exposed the fact that Parliament, although
constitutionally powerful, depends for its legislative might upon political
conditions: a clearly united voice and a sufficient government majority to give

28

House of Lords, The Salisbury-Addison Convention, U.K. PARLIAMENT (Oct. 2017),
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effect to this. Both were lacking in the Brexit process to the point that very little
meaningful law was made.
In such an environment, where the Commons is deeply divided and the
Government finds it difficult to control the legislative timetable, the role of the
Speaker can also be crucial both as neutral umpire and as facilitator of
parliamentary business. In fact, the Speaker came to play a prominent and deeply
controversial part in 2018−19, presenting yet another impediment to
Parliament’s role as lawmaker.
The curious office of Speaker has evolved over time through the practice of
the Commons. It derives its authority from, and is regulated by, the law and
custom of Parliament rather than legislation. Originally the voice of the Monarch
in Parliament, the function of the Speaker evolved over time. It was during the
constitutional turmoil of the 17th century that the Speaker’s role changed
markedly from representative of the king to representative of the House of
Commons itself.32 In the latter role, the Speaker became very much the
champion of the independence of the Commons from the Monarch. The
responsibilities of the Speaker also have evolved over time. One of these
responsibilities is the authority to regulate Commons debates and procedures.
This is a particularly significant power, particularly in the case of a “hung
parliament” where the government has difficulty in asserting its control over the
parliamentary process despite Standing Orders clearly prioritising the
government’s legislative programme.
Speaker John Bercow emerges from this period as a deeply tainted figure.
Often grandstanding and seemingly in search of the limelight, he ignored the
adage that a good referee is the person not noticed during the game. In light of
the way in which he bent procedural rules, it is no surprise that many viewed
him as complicit in aiding pro-Remain members of Parliament in frustrating the
Leave agenda of the Government and with it the popularly expressed will of the
people. In his appropriately titled autobiography, Bercow claims: “As Speaker,
my job was not to presume to know the ‘will of the people’ but to facilitate the
will of Parliament.”33 Maybe so, but in a situation of deep division, the will of
Parliament was very hard to determine, and Bercow demonstrated a
preparedness to favour procedurally the will of some over the will of others.
Where one stands on Bercow’s role is a matter of opinion. For some, he
really was standing up for backbenchers against an over-bearing government;
for others, he undermined the legitimate role of the Government to pursue the
legislative agenda it was elected to pursue. This episode does, however, raise a
wider question in relation to Parliament’s power. It is clear that the Speaker can
assume a very influential role in the Commons in the event of a perfect storm.
When the Government has only a flimsy working majority, where issues of great
importance are before Parliament in the form of legislation, and where the
Speaker decides to operate in a partisan manner and is willing to use his
procedural powers in doing so, the Speaker can become a major impediment to
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the passage of legislation.34 But is this an example of a further long-term
undermining of Parliament’s constitutional role? I do not think it is. The period
up to the 2019 general election was highly unusual. In a situation where a
Speaker does not abuse his or her position, even a weak government should still
be able to promote its legislation before Parliament. If the Government has a
working majority, this can be used to override any obstructionism by a Speaker
or indeed to replace the Speaker. That said, the period of legislative stasis from
2018–19, which was mainly the result of divisions within the Commons and
Lords themselves, suggests that “sovereignty” is a hard quality to ascribe to such
a pluralist institution in which power is so disputed and when law-making is
such a fraught and at times impossible thing to achieve.

IV. PARLIAMENT: INSEPARABLE FROM, AND CONDITIONED BY, THE EXECUTIVE
I have noted that the legislative supremacy of Parliament must be situated
in the context of Parliament’s composition and that is better described as the
legislative supremacy of the Crown in Parliament. This highlights the fact that
the United Kingdom does not have a formal separation of powers and that the
constitution operates through a deeply inter-connected and multi-dimensional
relationship between the legislative and executive branches. The Crown, as Her
Majesty’s Government, sits in Parliament and controls the vast majority of the
legislative programme. Legislation is passed by both Houses but also depends,
for its validity, upon the consent of the Crown. Although this latter role is a mere
formality, of far greater significance is the Crown’s influence in initiating and
leading the passage of legislation through both houses.
When we talk either of Parliament’s sovereignty or, less ambitiously, of its
legislative supremacy, each concept must acknowledge that this authority is one
that is shared intimately with the executive. This inter-connection is a legacy of
Parliament’s history as advisory council to the king. Although the Glorious
Revolution of 1688–89 and the Bill of Rights that framed its constitutional
outcome are often presented as symbolising the victory of Parliament over the
Crown, and while in relation to the usurped Stuart monarch this is not without
some degree of accuracy, the deal forged in the Bill of Rights and accepted by
William III and subsequently by the Hanoverian succession was certainly no
republican victory. It was in effect an agreement of peaceful coexistence
between Parliament and the Protestant monarchy whereby the Crown remained
a central, and in many ways a controlling, presence in Parliament. Although the
personal power of the Monarch fell away, this was more than compensated for
by the presence in Parliament of the Sovereign’s ministers whose power has only
grown over the intervening centuries. The reality today is that the government
of the day largely controls the parliamentary process, in particular the legislative
timetable, largely through Standing Orders (in particular, SO14).35 In this way,

David Howarth, Speaker John Bercow shows the government’s control is on even shakier ground than
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Parliament’s legislative supremacy is in political terms also the supremacy of
the government of the day; and arguably more the latter than the former.36
From the perspective of a separation of powers, for some it did feel in 2018–
19 that the House of Commons, if it could speak with one voice, had in fact
wrested the agenda-setting power from the Government. Aided by the Speaker,
MPs were able to propose motions which forced votes on important matters and
came close to taking over the legislative programme altogether. Such a reductive
analysis requires a significant point of qualification. This may have been a
victory of sorts, but it is far too simplistic to present this simply as a Commons
triumph over the Government. The Commons was bitterly divided and every
victory for those who sought to frustrate or condition Brexit was a defeat for
those parliamentarians elected to give effect to the Brexit decision. Furthermore,
Parliament’s supremacy, if it means anything, lies in the passage of legislation,
not in frustrating it. Ultimately, Parliament cannot be conceived of as distinct
from the executive. This is an enduring lesson of the Brexit process and one that
conditions any notion of Parliament as sovereign.

V. PARLIAMENT AND THE EXECUTIVE: DISPUTING THE CONTENT OF
LEGISLATION
Parliament has other important roles beyond the passage of law. Insofar as
it takes on a persona that is at least conceptually separable from the executive, a
crucial function is its scrutiny and amendment functions, changing legislation
and in particular reining in the powers which the government seeks to grant itself
through law. I now turn to how this relationship worked, arguably successfully,
in the passage of significant legislation during the Brexit process. Parliament’s
role as a scrutinising and revising chamber can be seen in the passage of the
seminal piece of Brexit legislation, the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018.
After more than 40 years within the European legal framework, the U.K.
has transposed over 20,000 pieces of European legislation into U.K. law by
various legal means.37 After the 2016 referendum, it was clear that these would
have to be sorted and either retained or repealed in fairly short order. Legislation
was needed, and the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill was drafted for this
purpose. The difficulty faced by the drafters was the uncertainty surrounding
which laws would go and which would stay; much would depend upon ongoing
negotiations with the European Union both to secure a transitional agreement
and then to settle upon a final relationship treaty.
The solution upon which the Government settled was to keep all of this law
on the statute books, give it a new status as “retained E.U. law,” and to provide
the Government with wide secondary law-making powers to sort through it and
decide what to keep and what to dispose of. The problems were manifold,
including how to define “retained E.U. law,” what status to give this law in
36
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relation to other law passed by Parliament, the role the courts should have in
interpreting retained E.U. law, guidelines judges should be given, and which
powers should go to the devolved territories to deal with retained E.U. law in
areas of devolved competence.
The other major issue, which is the only one I have space here to discuss, is
the powers of the Government itself to make secondary legislation. As originally
framed in the Bill, the Government would have been given an effectively openended power with very little in the way of limits and subject only to minimal
levels of parliamentary scrutiny.38 The Bill was critiqued extensively by
parliamentary committees and on the floor of both houses. Parliamentarians got
to grips with the detail and came up with constructive suggestions for its
improvement. The Government gave ground in several ways. It limited the range
of matters to which the powers would apply, it removed some altogether, and it
agreed to enhanced scrutiny of these secondary powers. A “sifting committee”
system was instituted in both houses. This allows a parliamentary committee to
assess a secondary instrument for its significance. If it is deemed to concern an
important area of law, then it will be subjected to full parliamentary assessment.
If the committee considers its implications to be technical or trivial, then less
scrutiny is needed.
The passage of the Bill is a good example of Parliament working as it should
in its scrutinising capacity.39 The Government was giving effect to an election
commitment by bringing forward a bill of great constitutional significance.
Parliament considered that its role was to pass the bill, but also to ensure that it
was fully compliant with constitutional principles such as the rule of law and
safeguards against excessive executive power. This was in many ways a positive
engagement between Government and Parliament before the system started to
break down over E.U. negotiations. The Bill highlighted how, when Parliament
is working well, backbench MPs and the Lords are prepared to challenge the
executive in the passage of legislation, making this a more genuinely
collaborative process, while not blocking legislation altogether. In this way, the
legitimacy of Parliament’s legislative supremacy was arguably strengthened,
highlighting that in its law-making role it remains significant as a genuinely
powerful and assertive revising forum rather than just a tool in the hands of the
executive.40
The story of course does not end there. Since then, there has been a glut of
Brexit-related legislation and Parliament’s success in reining in executive power
has been more mixed. This is especially so since the 2019 election when, with a
large majority, the new Government has not felt so compelled to give ground.
The Government continues to accept modified powers, as in the Trade Act 2021
and Agriculture Act 2020. In other legislation , powers are framed in extremely
wide ways. One example is the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020
where the Government assumes to itself almost unlimited powers to amend the
provisions of the act itself.41 In some sense today we see the other side of the
coin from the pre-election period. At that time MPs who favoured the passage
38
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of law were frustrated due to strong opposition. Today, with a numerically strong
government, MPs who seek to influence the content of legislation can be very
weak. Each set of circumstances highlights how, fundamentally, Parliament’s
power as a revising chamber is largely dependent upon political circumstances.
The landscape since the 2019 election reminds us that the Crown in
Parliament remains very powerful. But it is also the case that its legislative
supremacy exists in consequence of the deep relationship between Parliament as
legislature and Crown as executive. It is this relationship that gives the political
constitution, as an alignment of the two democratic branches, its full legitimacy
and force. But for Parliament to play its role fully within this relationship, it must
properly and effectively perform its scrutinizing and revising roles; otherwise,
Parliament becomes just the tool of the executive, and any notion of
parliamentary supremacy slides into executive supremacy. This remains a real
danger as the Government seeks to give effect to Brexit quickly through the
acquisition of extensive secondary powers.
VI. PARLIAMENT’S NOISY NEIGHBOUR: THE U.K. SUPREME COURT
When Alex Ferguson was head coach of Manchester United, he would
infuriate Manchester City fans by calling the underachieving team from across
the city “the noisy neighbours.” Manchester City is no longer underachieving,
and neither is Parliament’s increasingly noisy neighbour, the U.K. Supreme
Court, situated in its own building across Parliament Square. It was during the
Brexit process that the country’s highest court became increasingly vocal as an
antagonist to the Government and, arguably, to Parliament itself.
A defining feature of Parliament’s legislative supremacy is that it is not
subject to substantive judicial review. U.K. courts do not have authority to strike
down primary legislation on the grounds of constitutionality. That said, the
United Kingdom judiciary has become more assertive in recent decades,
certainly in relation to the executive but also increasingly in relation to
Parliament. This is an issue on which my two co-commentators have done
considerable work. Richard through the influential Judicial Power Project as
well as his own writings,42 and Erin through her comparative analysis of recent
English jurisprudence.43
The U.K. Supreme Court became involved dramatically in the Brexit
process in two main cases. Neither was a direct challenge to Parliament’s lawmaking authority, but each was significant both for the Court’s articulation of
its understanding of Parliament’s constitutional position, and for the role which
the Court took upon itself in this process of articulation. Each case focused upon
different dimensions of the Royal Prerogative. This is an ancient area of law, the
residue of the Crown’s lawful power in areas such as foreign affairs and national
defence. The prerogative remained part of constitutional law after 1688, albeit
curtailed by the Bill of Rights and by Parliament’s power to legislate contrary to
and in superiority over prerogative powers. These powers, apart from a few
42
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personal prerogatives vested in the person of the Monarch such as the granting
of certain titles, rest with the government of the day or in the person of individual
ministers, in particular the Prime Minister.
Miller I was a case that concerned the prerogative power of treaty-making.44
The issue was whether the Government could, by way of this prerogative power,
notify the European Commission of the U.K.’s intention to withdraw from the
European Union under Article 50 of the Treaty of European Union. The U.K.
Supreme Court concluded that it could not and that an act of Parliament was
required to take this step. The Court reasoned that since the U.K.’s obligations
under E.U. law, now such an embedded part of domestic law, were a direct
consequence of the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA), Parliament would
be required by legislation to authorise the notificatory step that would inevitably
lead to the termination of these obligations and the removal of much of this
domestic law. There are different ways of looking at this decision. It can be
interpreted as an unwarranted interference with the authority of the Crown to
make treaties or presented as the Supreme Court standing up for Parliament. The
decision was in my view a misreading of the scope of the prerogative power to
make treaties, but there was at least a prima facie argument that Parliament had
warranted the court’s role here and that the ECA had indeed conditioned how
the U.K. should withdraw. In the end the decision was of only marginal effect.
The Government had clear parliamentary support to trigger Article 50; when the
judgment was rendered, Parliament was quick to legislate, authorising Article
50 notification.45 In that statute, which might well have been termed the Hollow
Legal Victory Act, Parliament did not take the opportunity to constrain the
discretion of the Government in relation to the subsequent withdrawal process,
in effect handing to the executive the wide power which it had believed itself to
possess through the prerogative.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Miller I is tenuous, but it is at least
sustainable. It is far harder to understand the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller
II.46 This was both more controversial and potentially of greater significance,
coming as it did on September 29, 2019, as the clock ticked down to the U.K.’s
withdrawal from the E.U. on October 31. The context was the attempt by the
Government to prorogue Parliament due to the effective deadlock in Parliament
which both prevented endorsement of the draft withdrawal agreement and
represented an attempt by a group of MPs to take control of parliamentary
business.
The power of prorogation is an ancient prerogative power. Its effect is to
end a parliamentary session and mark the gap between that session and the next.
It differs from dissolution which dissolves Parliament ahead of a general
election. In Miller II, the court reviewed the Government’s decision to prorogue
and concluded that the Government had no lawful power to prorogue Parliament
and end the sitting of that session.47 This was a remarkable conclusion. The
power to prorogue Parliament has always been understood to rest squarely with
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the Crown, and certainly not to be open to judicial review, as a central part of
Parliament’s internal function.
The Court called upon two principles to defend its radical innovation. The
first was, in fact, parliamentary sovereignty. In this claim it draws a tortuous,
indeed odd, connection between parliamentary sovereignty and the very sitting
of Parliament: seemingly, the simplistic notion that if Parliament isn’t sitting it
can’t exercise this sovereignty. The principle of parliamentary sovereignty, or
as I have framed it, of legislative supremacy, is however not concerned with the
sitting of Parliament but with its legislative authority. In other situations where
courts have used parliamentary sovereignty to justify constraining an otherwise
lawful competence, they have done so in the context of statute, by citing
Parliament’s intention to limit a particular power. This was certainly a key
rationale in Miller I. However, the Supreme Court was unable to call upon this
argument in relation to prorogation. Parliament had unequivocally rejected any
legal circumscription of this prerogative power in the Fixed-term Parliaments
Act 2011. This important statute set fixed terms for general elections to occur
every five years. Until then the Government had free rein to dissolve Parliament
at any time in its five-year cycle. In making the new rule, however, Parliament
was clear that the restriction of the dissolution power “does not affect Her
Majesty’s power to prorogue Parliament.”48 It is difficult to see therefore how
this can be justified on the basis of Parliament’s legal supremacy, particularly
since Parliament could have legislated to stop the prorogation if it had so wished.
The second arm of the court’s justification was an appeal to the
“fundamental principle” of “Parliamentary accountability.” Accountability is
indeed central to the U.K. system of government, but it is an amorphous,
nebulous constitutional concept with no legal source in prerogative, statute, or
common law. There are of course conventions of ministerial responsibility to
Parliament, but it is long settled that these are not judicially enforceable.49
Somehow in Miller, the elastic principle of accountability was ascribed with
sufficient normative authority to justify placing legal limits on the prerogative
of prorogation, despite the specific exclusion of this prerogative from legal
controls by Parliament itself.
The Court also goes further, suggesting that the Crown has a duty to justify
the use of the prerogative power of prorogation. That there is a legal onus on the
Crown to justify its use of the power:
It is impossible for us to conclude, on the evidence which has
been put before us, that there was any reason—let alone a good
reason—to advise her Majesty to prorogue Parliament for five
weeks … We cannot speculate, in the absence of further
evidence, upon what such reasons might have been.50
This suggests that the principle of parliamentary accountability has acquired
the authority of a new precautionary principle in relation to prorogation; the
48

Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, c. 14, § 6(1) (note that in the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation
etc.) Act 2019, c. 22, § 3(4), Parliament provided for the possibility of recall during a prorogation period
by way of a Royal Proclamation but did not seek to delimit the scope of the power itself).
49
Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke & George [1968] UKPC 18, [1969] 1 AC 645 (appeal taken from S.
Rhodesia).
50
R v. The Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41 [61].

18

NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.

vol. XII:1

Crown, if challenged, is now required to offer acceptable political reasons to the
courts for any decision to prorogue. This is in my view an astonishing level of
interference by the courts with the political constitution.51
In both these cases the court claimed to be acting in Parliament’s name,
defending Parliament from an over-reaching executive. In the first case, this had
some degree of superficial plausibility, but in the latter, it does not stand up.
Instead, the Supreme Court invaded an area of hitherto exclusive parliamentary
jurisdiction. The question then is whether this marks a category shift in the
court’s approach. As I say, various commentators add these decisions to a wider
story of greater judicial assertiveness. In these cases, and in extra-judicial
pronouncements before and during the Brexit process, senior judges certainly
gave the impression that they are increasingly prepared to constrain Parliament’s
legislative power.52

VII. PARLIAMENT AND THE DEVOLUTION CHALLENGE
Parliament created the devolved institutions in 1998. In doing so, it was
careful to assert that it retained its own legislative supremacy. From this
perspective devolution seems very different from federalism: the constitution
constrains the powers of the territorial governments but not those of the central
government. It is also the case that at the time of its creation, Westminster made
clear that the very existence of devolution depended upon Parliament. By the
logic of legislative supremacy, devolution could be removed by simple act of
Parliament. Secondly, Parliament retained the authority to legislate in devolved
areas even though it agreed by convention not to do so in “normal”
circumstances without the consent of the relevant devolved legislatures.
The U.K. state received a shock to the system in the independence
referendum held in Scotland on September 18th, 2014. On the question: “Should
Scotland be an independent country?”, “Yes or No,” 45% voted “Yes.” This was
too close for comfort and immediately plans were put in place to try to placate
nationalist sentiment. One strand of this was constitutional. In the Scotland Act
2016, two moves were made that moved the U.K., institutionally, in a federal
direction. The first step was a legislative declaration that Scottish devolution was
permanent.53 Of course an argument rages as to whether the U.K. Parliament
could simply override this later in time.54 This issue has never been tested. The
second, which is of more immediate practical relevance, is a statutory
recognition that Parliament will respect devolved autonomy. Under the Scotland
Act 1998, section 28 sets out the legislative power of the Scottish Parliament.55
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It also provides that section 28 “does not affect the power of the Parliament of
the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland.”56 I noted that a convention
developed to limit Parliament’s sphere of operation, and this has now been
recognised in the Scotland Act 2016.57 The new section 28(8) of the Scotland
Act 1998 states: “it is recognised that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will
not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the
Scottish Parliament.”58 Notably, this new section was not the conversion of the
convention into a legal rule, but rather a curious legal recognition that a
convention exists.
The provision has in fact been tested, in Miller I.59 The argument went that
if legislation was needed to trigger Article 50 notification, then by this provision
of the Scotland Act, the consent of the Scottish Parliament was also required.60
Leaving the European Union would affect devolved matters and so consent
would be needed. The court side-stepped the issue of whether the convention
was engaged. It fell back on the issue ex ante that conventions are not legally
enforceable. Here, the court took a very orthodox approach to this provision.
The Supreme Court took the view that the Sewel convention,61 even with
statutory recognition, constituted no more than “legislative recognition” of a
“political convention” which “operates as a political restriction on the activity
of the U.K. Parliament.”62 The court could not treat the convention as a legal
restriction, but nor did it even emphasise its status as a constitutional rule
moderating behaviour but falling short of being a law—the normative via media
by which conventions are given salience within our uncodified constitution.63 In
this way, the U.K.’s devolution settlements have not been treated by the courts
as any kind of constraint upon Parliament during the Brexit process.
However, the other area in which devolution has surfaced as significant is
in the passing of Brexit legislation itself. Here, there is evidence that the
devolved territories can be influential and when they are not, they can show
enough political weight to push for greater power. In the passage of the main
Brexit bill, the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (EUWA), the initial
draft planned for all powers to come back from Brussels to London; the U.K.
government would then distribute them to the devolved authorities in due
course.64 This caused such an uproar that the plan was fundamentally changed,
with powers returning directly to the devolved areas unless there were
exceptional circumstances.65
A more recent example illustrates that Parliament will, on occasion, override
the will of the devolved authorities. With a large majority in Parliament, the
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Government was able to secure the passage of the United Kingdom Internal
Market Bill despite criticism from the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish
governments that it took away a lot of their power in pursuit of frictionless trade
across the U.K.66 The devolved legislatures refused to consent to the Bill, but
Parliament passed it anyway.67 This clearly shows Parliament’s legislative
supremacy in relation to other lawmakers in the United Kingdom. Again,
however, it is important not to confuse the formal power to pass legislation with
sovereignty. Secessionist sentiment in Northern Ireland and Scotland is being
stoked and the pressure from the Scottish National Party for a referendum in
Scotland after the Scottish parliament elections in 2021 continued, one key
argument being that Westminster is rolling back from the obligations it passed
in the Scotland Act 2016.68 The new reality, recognised by the passage of the
EUWA, is that Westminster must condition its power in respect for devolution
or it could risk the Union itself.69 The United Kingdom Internal Market Act may
well be an outlier, replaced in time with an approach to devolution that clearly
constrains Westminster’s power to act in devolved areas. If it is not, the Union
itself could be in peril. Parliament may retain formal supremacy in relation to
the devolved territories, but the very sovereignty of the British state is at risk.

CONCLUSION
Parliament does remain legislatively supreme, but the Brexit process has
exposed how even the formalism of parliamentary supremacy is conditioned in
various ways. What has been emphasised over the past four years is that
Parliament cannot be characterised as one voice and that the divisions within it
can constrain its role as supreme legislator, at times even preventing any
meaningful legislation from passing. We have also seen how the very conception
of Parliament is one that must take account of its close relationship with the
Crown with which its legislative supremacy is shared. This can be a very
powerful association, the two great political institutions of the British state
working together. But if a fine balance is not maintained, Parliament’s
supremacy collapses into that of executive dominance. It is the perception of this
risk, rightly or wrongly, which the U.K.’s highest court now uses to justify itself
in wresting power not only from the latter but also, in effect, from the former,
bringing the U.K. closer than ever to a legally limited legislative authority.
My broader claim, however, is that in any event legislative supremacy is not
sovereignty. Sovereignty is a concept that embraces the deep interconnection
between the political and legal dimensions of state power: it is always
encapsulated in a relationship between the two. Parliament does not and never
has encapsulated the state, but at a time when the U.K. was unitary in its
government and free from deep entanglements with its European neighbours,
Parliament did at least appear to be a proxy for the state. Nearly fifty years of
E.U. membership showed the extent to which Parliament’s authority can in fact
be truncated by important political and legal commitments. It may be answered
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that power has now returned from Europe; the conclusion of the E.U.-U.K. Trade
and Cooperation Agreement on December 30th, 2020, is the basis for future
relations between the European Union and a fully independent U.K., but even it
binds the U.K. to customs controls in respect to Northern Ireland and to an
elaborate dispute resolution procedure.70 A clearer sovereignty challenge is
closer at hand. The rise of nationalism within the devolved territories has led
Parliament to cede more and more powers and even to attempt to limit its own
authority in relation to these territories. Parliament remains a uniquely powerful
legislature within modern democracies. But its supremacy is conditioned by the
fact that sovereignty is to be found elsewhere. Only by understanding the
changing nature of the U.K.’s sovereign relationships with its own territorial
minorities and the new relationships it forges with the outside world after Brexit
will we get a sense of the real limits of parliamentary authority.
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